State v. Frederick Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 36493 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
9-18-2007
State v. Frederick Respondent's Brief Dckt. 36493
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Frederick Respondent's Brief Dckt. 36493" (2007). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 264.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/264
Plaintiff-Respondent, j NO. 33575 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDA 




COREY SEAN FREDERICK, 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Entered on ATS by: - 
-I 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
1 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
HONORABLE JUNEAL C. KERRICK, District Judge 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Attorney General Deputy State Appellate 
State of Idaho Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER Boise, Idaho 83703 
Deputy Attorney General (208) 334-2712 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
JESSICA M. LORELLO 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................ ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................ I 
Nature Of The Case ................................................................................... I 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings ....................................... 1 
................................................................................................................. ISSUES 4 
ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................... 5 
I. Frederick Failed To Properly Preserve The Federal And 
State Constitutional Issues For Review ........................................... 5 
11. Assuming This Court Decides To Address Frederick's 
Constitutional Claims, Frederick Has Failed To Show 
The Search Of His Vehicle Violated His Rights Under 
The Fourth Amendment Or The Idaho Constitution ......................... 7 
........................................................................... A. Introduction 7 
B. Standard Of Review .............................................................. 8 
C. The Search Of Frederick's Vehicle Was A 
Constitutional Search Incident To Arrest Under 
Belfon, Thornton, And Watts ................................................. 8 
Ill. Frederick Has Failed To Offer Any Cogent Reason For 
Overruling Wags and Concluding Article I, 3 17 Of The 
ldaho Constitution Affords Greater Protections Than The 
........................................................................ Fourth Amendment I 0  
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .............................................................................. I 3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Hounhland Farms. Inc . v . Johnson. 119 Idaho 72. 803 P.2d 978 (1 990) ............ 11 
New York v . Belton. 453 U.S. 454 (1981) ................................................... passim 
State v . Avala. 129 Idaho 911. 935 P.2d 174 (Ct . App . 1996) ............................... 6 
State v . Charuentier. 131 Idaho 649. 962 P.2d 1033 (1998) ......................... 7. 8. 9 
State v . Guzman. 122 Idaho 981. 842 P.2d 660 (1992) ...................................... 11 
State v . Harvill. 131 Idaho 720. 963 P.2d 1157 (1998) .......................................... 9 
State v . Homolka. 131 Idaho 172. 953 P.2d 612 (1998) ..................................... 10 
State v . Holland. 135 Idaho 159. 15 P.3d 1167 (2000) ......................................... 8 
State v . Humphews. 134 Idaho 657. 8 P.3d 652 (2000) ..................................... 10 
State v . Martin. 119 Idaho 577. 808 P.2d 1322 (1991) .......................................... 5 
State v . Mauro. 121 Idaho 178. 824 P.2d 109 (1991) ........................................... 5 
State v . Newsom. 132 Idaho 698. 979 P.2d 100 (1998) ........................................ 9 
State v . Nickel. 134 Idaho 610. 7 P.3d 219 (2000) ................................................ 9 
State v . Ross. 129 Idaho 380. 924 P.2d 1224 (1996) ........................................... 6 
State v . Smith. 130 Idaho 450. 942 P.2d 574 (Ct . App . 1997) ........................... ... 5 
State v . Watts. 142 Idaho 230. 127 P.3d 133 (2005) .................................. passim 
State v . Webb. 130 Idaho 462. 943 P.2d 52 (1997) ............................................ 11 
State v . Wheaton. 121 Idaho 404. 825 P.2d 501 (1992) ................................... 5. 6 
Thornton v . U.S.. 541 U.S. 615 (2004) ....................................................... assim 
U.S. v . Dunn. 480 U.S. 294 (1987) ...................................................................... I 1  
CONSTlTUTlONS 
United States Constitution. Fourth Amendment ......................................... 5 6. 10 
Idaho Constitution. Article I. !j 13 .......................................................................... 6 
Idaho Constitution. Article 1. 5 17 .......................................................... 6 9. 10. 13 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Corey Frederick appeals from the judgment entered upon his conditional 
guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, preserving his right to appeal 
the denial of his suppression motion. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedinas 
The state filed an Information charging Frederick with possession of a 
controlled substance, methamphetamine. (R., pp.19-20.) Frederick filed a 
motion to suppress, alleging the search that led to the discovery of the 
methamphetamine violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, 
33 13 and 17 of the Idaho Constitution. (R., pp.23-24.) Specifically, Frederick 
contended that the search of his vehicle was unconstitutional under the United 
States Constitution because the arresting officer did not contact him until he was 
out of his truck, and therefore the truck was not within the scope of a search 
incident to arrest. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.39, L.17; p.43, L.18 - p.44, 
L. 17.) 
The district court held a hearing, denied the motion and issued a written 
order, in which it made the following uncontested factual findings: 
1. On the evening of November 9, 2005, Parma Police Officer 
Christopher Cutlen was providing assistance to Wilder Police 
Officer Dustin Tveidt, pursuant to a mutual aid agreement between 
those two municipalities. On that occasion he was providing 
assistance to the City of Wilder in an attempt to serve some 
outstanding arrest warrants. Officer Cullen had gone on shift at 
4:00 p.m. that day. He was advised by Officer Tveidt of a few 
names of people who were being sought. Officer Cullen was also 
advised by Officer Tveidt that a particular vehicle, a white pickup, 
possibly a Ford Ranger pickup with a utility box on the back, that 
was located in the 500 block at B Street in Wilder, Canyon County, 
Idaho, may be driven by one Corey Frederick, for whom there was 
an active warrant of arrest. 
2. Officer Cullen was traveling in his patrol vehicle to the 
Jackson's convenience store in Wilder to refill his mug of pop 
(soda) when the white Ford Ranger pickup that had been 
described for him as possibly linked to a warrant suspect drove in 
front of him on Highway 59. Officer Cullen followed the white 
pickup. He could not identify the driver of that vehicle at that time, 
and there was no evidence presented that Officer Cullen had 
received any information concerning Corey Frederick's physical 
description. The white Ford pickup pulled into the Jackson's store 
parking lot and Officer Cullen followed it into that parking lot. The 
driver of the white pickup parked on the right-hand side of the 
Jackson's store and got out of his vehicle. Officer Cullen parked 
his patrol vehicle out by the gas pumps, a distance of at least 
twenty (20) feet away from the white pickup. Before the driver of 
the white pickup shut the door to his vehicle, but after he was 
outside of his vehicle and walking toward the front of the Jackson's 
store, Officer Cullen from his location by the gas pumps called out 
the name, "Mr. Frederick." Officer Cullen had just exited his 
vehicle to go into the store to refill his soda pop mug, and he was 
at that time standing right beside his patrol car door. Officer 
Cullen called out Mr. Frederick's name, even though he did not 
really know if that was him; that was just the name that Officer 
Cullen had been given as possibly matching that vehicle. The 
driver of the vehicle, without closing the vehicle door, turned 
around in response to that name and acknowledged it, saying 
"yes." Officer Cullen than asked the driver to approach him. As 
the driver walked towards him, Officer Cullen told him that there 
was a warrant for his arrest. Officer Cullen then took the driver 
into custody on that warrant (State's Exhibit 1). The driver was 
handcuffed and he was seated in the back seat of the officer's 
patrol car. Officer Cullen then went to the white pickup that had 
been driven to the Jackson's store by the arrested driver. 
Because the driver had no identification on him, the officer went to 
the pickup and "cleared" the front of the cab to make sure that it 
was safe to bring his canine drug detection partner up to the 
vehicle to search it. The officer took his flashlight, looked in, and 
made sure that there was nothing inside the vehicle, such as 
knives, sharp objects, or even food, that could potentially harm his 
canine partner, which was still in the patrol vehicle. During all of 
this time, the driver's side door to the pick up truck had not been 
closed. 
3. Officer Cullen's drug dog has been trained as a passive- 
trained response dog, so when the dog detects the odor of a 
narcotic substance, he will "sit." Officer Cullen first had his canine 
drug detection canine partner search around the exterior of the 
white pickup that had been driven by the individual he had 
arrested. After completing that, the dog went into the pickup 
through the open driver's door. Upon entering the pickup through 
that open door, the dog immediately "sat," indicating that he had 
detected the odor of a substance that he was trained to identify. 
Following that response, Officer Cullen then pointed to individual 
objects contained in the passenger compartment of the pickup. In 
the white pickup, the dog "indicated" or "sat" on a shaving kit bag 
on the passenger seat under the lunch box and also on a little 
metallic-type pen tube that was sitting on the floor. Ultimately, a 
substance that presumptively tested positive for 
methamphetamine was located in the vehicle. 
4. The driver of the white Ford pickup at the Jackson's store, 
who indicated affirmatively to Officer Cullen that he was "Cory 
Frederick," was identified by Officer Cullen in this court as the 
Defendant in this action. 
(R., pp.48-50.) 
Frederick thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of 
methamphetamine, preserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression 
motion. (Change of Plea Hrg., p.4, Ls.19-23.) The district court imposed a 
unified seven year sentence with three years fixed, but suspended execution of 
the sentence and placed Frederick on probation for four years. (R., pp.72-74.) 
Frederick timely appealed. (R., pp.88-90.) 
ISSUES 
Frederick states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Frederick's motion to 
suppress? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
1. Is the issue Frederick attempts to raise on appeal not preserved because 
it was not raised below and is beyond the scope of the issues preserved by his 
conditional guilty plea? 
2. Officer Cullen searched Frederick's vehicle incident to a valid arrest. To 
the extent Frederick may have raised or preserved issues, has Frederick failed to 
establish that such a search violates his constitutional rights? 
3. Even if Frederick had preserved the issue he raises on appeal, has he 
failed to show that ldaho precedent interpreting the rights granted by Art. I, 3 17 
of the ldaho Constitution are co-extensive with the rights granted by the Fourth 
Amendment is wrong or should be overruled? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Frederick Failed To Properlv Preserve The Federal And State Constitutional 
Issues For Review 
Frederick asserts that the search of his vehicle violated both his federal 
and state constitutional rights. (Appellant's brief, p.5.) This Court should decline 
to consider the merits of Frederick's arguments because he failed to preserve the 
federal or state constitutional issues for appeal. 
It is well settled that issues not raised before the trial court will not be 
considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Martin, 119 ldaho 577, 579, 808 
P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991). See also, State v. Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 181, 824 
P.2d 109, 112 (1991); State v. Smith, 130 ldaho 450,454,942 P.2d 574, 578 (Ct. 
App. 1997). On appeal, Frederick urges the court to overrule its decision in State 
v. Watts, 142 ldaho 230, 127 P.3d 133 (2005), and instead limit the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). to cases 
"where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might 
be found in the vehicle," and hold that the ldaho Constitution provides greater 
protection than the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
(Appellant's brief, p.19.) A review of the record in this case shows that these 
issues were neither adequately raised to nor decided by the district court and 
were not preserved by the conditional plea agreement. 
In State v. Wheaton, 121 ldaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 504 (1992), the 
court held that Wheaton could not assert for the first time on appeal that the 
search of his automobile violated his rights under the ldaho Constitution. The 
court explained: 
The defendant urges this Court to construe ldaho 
Constitution art. I, § 17, to provide more protections than afforded 
by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution . . . . 
In his motion to suppress, the defendant alleged that his 
"federal and state civil rights were violated" as required by "the 
federal and state constitutions and by state law." The defendant 
failed to further clarify his state constitutional argument. We 
cannot find in the record any reference to an argument seeking a 
greater scope of protection under the ldaho Constitution. This 
Court will not consider issues not raised in the court below. In re 
Maffer of Williams, 120 ldaho 473, 817 P.2d 139 (1991); Sfafe v. 
Marfin, 118 ldaho 334, 796 P.2d 1007 (1990); Sfafe v. Kellogg, 
102 ldaho 628, 636 P.2d 750 (1981); Lockard v. State, 92 ldaho 
813, 451 P.2d 1014 (1969). Therefore we will not consider the 
defendant's argument. 
Wheaton, 121 ldaho at 406-07, 825 P.2d at 504. 
As in Wheaton, Frederick's motion to suppress contained a general 
allegation that the search of his vehicle violated his rights under the Fourth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, §§ 13 and 17 of the ldaho 
Constitution. (R. p.23.) However, Frederick never clarified his state 
constitutional arguments before the district court; and he never asserted that 
Article I, 3 17 of the ldaho Constitution should provide greater protections than 
the U.S. Constitution. As such, this Court should refuse to consider the merits of 
Frederick's state constitutional claim. Wheaton, 121 ldaho at 407, 825 P.2d at 
504. See also, State v. Ross, 129 ldaho 380, 924 P.2d 1224 (1996); State v. 
w, 129 ldaho 911,919,935 P.2d 174, 182 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Similarly, the Fourth Amendment claim Frederick asserts on appeal is not 
the same claim he asserted in the district court. Frederick's suppression 
argument was based solely on his contention that because the officer did not 
"contact" him while he was still in his vehicle, a search under Belton was not 
warranted. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.39, L.17; p.43, L.18 - p.44, L.17.) On 
appeal, however, Frederick argues that Belton should be limited to searches 
where the officer has reason to believe the automobile contains evidence related 
to the crime for which the defendant was arrested and that this Court should 
overrule State v. Watts, in which the ldaho Supreme Court declined to limit 
Beiton in this way. (Appeflant's brief, pp.9-15.) Frederick's appellate claim 
requesting a change in the law relating to Fourth Amendment searches of 
vehicles is fundamentally different than his claim in district court that a search 
was not justified on the facts because the contact occurred outside the vehicle. 
As such, he has failed to preserve the issue for review. 
Assuming This Court Decides To Address Frederick's Constitutional Claims, 
Frederick Has Failed To Show The Search Of His Vehicle Violated His Riqhts 
Under The Fourth Amendment Or The ldaho Constitution 
A. Introduction 
Frederick urges this Court to ignore the holdings in Thornton v. US., 541 
U.S. 615 (2004), limit the rule established in m, overrule State v. Watts, 142 
ldaho 230, 127 P.3d 133 (2005), and determine that the ldaho Constitution 
provides greater protections than the Fourth Amendment. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.11-17.) Frederick's arguments fail. The district court correctly applied the 
Belton rule, as adopted by the ldaho Supreme Court in State v. Charpentier, 131 
ldaho 649, 962 P.2d 1033 (1998), and reaffirmed in Watts, and he has failed to 
offer any basis for concluding the ldaho Constitution offers greater protections in 
this area of law. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. The 
appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by 
substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles 
to the facts as found. Watts, 142 Idaho at 232, 127 P.3d at 135; State v. Holland, 
135 ldaho 159,161,15 P.3d 1167,1169 (2000). 
C. The Search Of Frederick's Vehicle Was A Constitutional Search Incident 
To Arrest Under Belton. Thornton. And Wafts 
The district court correctly denied Frederick's motion to suppress as the 
search was reasonable under the well-established search incident to arrest 
exception to the warrant requirement. In New York v. Belton, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that an officer may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle 
incident to the lawful arrest of one of its occupants. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). In 
Thornton v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court extended the Belton rule, holding 
"Belton governs even when an officer does not make contact until the person 
arrested has left the vehicle." 541 U.S. 615, 616 (2004). 
In State v. Charpentier, the ldaho Supreme Court adopted the rule 
established by the United States Supreme Court in Belton "as the proper 
interpretation of Article I, Cj 17 of the ldaho Constitution." 131 ldaho 649, 652, 
962 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1998). The Charpentier Court focused on the need to 
formulate a clear rule and explained: 
The disarray in results noted by the United State Supreme Court 
and the need for a clear rule understood by both the public and the 
police are compelling reasons to adopt the rule enunciated in 
Belton as the proper interpretation of Article I, § 17 of the ldaho 
Constitution. There is nothing in our history or jurisprudence that 
indicates a contrary result should be reached. There is merit in 
having the same rule of law applicable within the borders of our 
state, whether an interpretation of the Fourth Amendment or its 
counterpart - Article I, § 17 of the ldaho Constitution - is involved. 
Such consistency makes sense to the police and the public. 
Under the rule adopted by this Court, the police know what they 
can do after they have made a lawful arrest. The public knows the 
extent of protection afforded from a search while utilizing the 
automobile. The automobile is not a haven for weapons, 
contraband, or evidence of criminal activity once the threshold 
requirement that there be a lawful arrest has been reached. 
Charpentier, 131 ldaho at 653,962 P.2d at 1037 
Since its decision in Charpentier, the ldaho Supreme Court has continued 
to adhere to the bright-line rule of Belton as the proper interpretation of Article I, 
§ 17 of the ldaho Constitution. See, e.g., m, 142 ldaho 230, 127 P.3d 133; 
State v. Nickel, 134 ldaho 610, 7 P.3d 219 (2000); State v. Newsom, 132 ldaho 
698, 979 P.2d 100 (1 998); State v. Harvill, 131 ldaho 720, 963 P.2d 11 57 (1 998). 
Here, Officer Cullen had a valid warrant for Frederick's arrest for failure to 
appear. (State's Exhibit 1; Tr., p.18, Ls.9-15; p.19, Ls.14-23.) Officer Cullen 
contacted Frederick when Frederick was still standing in the open door of his 
pickuptruck. (Supp. Hrg.Tr., p.10, L.14-p.12, L.7; p.26, L . l l  -p.27, L.14; R., 
pp.48-49.) Officer Cullen contacted Frederick and Frederick identified himself, 
after which Officer Cullen told Frederick he had an outstanding warrant for his 
arrest. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.10, L.24 - p.1 I ,  L.3.) Officer Cullen arrested Frederick 
and then properly conducted a search of his vehicle and the containers' within 
the passenger compartment which revealed the methamphetamine Frederick 
was charged with possessing. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.12, L.6 - p.17, L.9.) Because 
Officer Cullen conducted the search of Frederick's vehicle pursuant to a valid 
arrest, the search and subsequent seizure of the items found in the passenger 
compartment of Frederick's car were valid. 
Frederick Has Failed To Offer Any Coaent Reason For Overrulinn Wafts And 
Concludinq Article I, 5 17 Of The ldaho Constitution Affords Greater Protections 
Than The Fourth Amendment 
Frederick asks this Court to overrule Watts and conclude that the ldaho 
Constitution should provide greater protection than the Fourth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution as interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Belton and 
Thornton. (Appellant's brief, p.16.) Frederick's argument is without merit 
because he has failed to offer any cogent reason why this Court should depart 
from well established ldaho law regarding automobile searches incident to arrest. 
The ldaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that controlling precedent 
will not be overruled "unless it is manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time 
to be unjust or unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate the plain, 
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice." State v. Humpherys, 
' A valid automobile search incident to arrest includes "the passenger 
compartment and any containers within it." State v. Homolka, 131 ldaho 172, 
174, 953 P.2d 612,614 (1998). 
134 ldaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting Houclhland Farms, Inc. v. 
Johnson, 119 ldaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)). See also, State v. 
Guzman, 122 ldaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) ("[Plrior decision of this 
Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong or have proven over time 
to be unjust or unwise."). 
While the ldaho Supreme Court has at times expanded the protections 
offered under its constitution beyond those found within the federal constitution, it 
has done so in very specific circumstances and mainly with regard to privacy 
expectations in one's home. As the court noted, "the automobile is not 
comparable to the home. The expectation of privacy within the automobile falls 
far short of that accorded to the sanctuary of the home." 142 ldaho at 234, 127 
P.3d at 137. Frederick has failed to offer a specific reason or unique 
characteristic found in the state of ldaho to justify a departure from current ldaho 
law regarding searches conducted incident to a valid arrest. See, e.g., State v. 
Webb, 130 ldaho 462, 467, 943 P.2d 52, 57 (1997) (examining curtilage 
boundaries for private property in ldaho and holding, "in addition to considering 
the [factors in U.S. v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987)] . . . [tlhe trial court must . . . 
take into consideration the difference in custom and terrain within different areas 
of the state when contemplating particutar expectations of privacy.") 
More importantly, Frederick has failed to provide any cogent reason for 
overruling m, in which the ldaho Supreme Court rejected the same claim 
made by Frederick in this appeal, i.e., that Belton should be limited and ldaho 
should adopt Justice Scalia's concurrence in Thornton, where Scalia wrote that 
he would limit a search incident to arrest "to cases where it is reasonable to 
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle." 
(Appellant's brief, p.14; Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631.) Frederick's claim fails 
because he has not established that Watts is manifestly wrong, or that it has 
proven unjust or unwise over time. 
Although Frederick argues "it is now necessary to overrule Watts, . . . in 
order to remedy continued injustice created by the bright line rule articulated in 
Belton" (Appellant's brief, p.15), he has failed to articulate any valid basis for 
doing so. The result and reasoning of Watts is sound. As explained by the Court 
[Olfficer safety and preservation of evidence justify the search 
incident to arrest . . . . [Tlhe level of privacy due the automobile Is 
satisfied by the requirement that there must be a lawful arrest of the 
occupant before a search of the contents may take place. 
It i; also important to know that when an arrest has been 
made of the occupant . . . of an automobile that the automobile can 
be left untended with the assurance that any weapons, evidence of 
crime or contraband have been removed from the reach of passerby 
or confederates in unlawful activity. 
142 ldaho at 234, 127 P.3d at 137. 
As discussed above, the ldaho Supreme Court has already considered 
the issue of limiting the Belton rule and declined to do so. In fact, some of the 
very circumstances that the court pointed out as justifications for Belton 
searches can be found in Frederick's case. This Court should decline 
Frederick's invitation to overrule and limit the Belton rule because he has 
provided no specific reason for this Court to depart from precedent. ldaho case 
law supports the need for a consistent rule in this area of the law and the ldaho 
Supreme Court has already determined it does not need to expand the 
protections of Article I, § 17 of the ldaho Constitution with regard to automobile 
searches incident to arrest. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the district court's order denying 
Frederick's motion to suppress, and therefore Frederick's judgment of conviction, 
be affirmed. 
DATED this 18'~ day of September 2007. 
Jennifer E. Birken 
Attorney at Law 
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